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African peacekeepers in Africa
The role of United States assistance
and training
Nikolas Emmanuel
African states today are strongly encouraged by the United States (US) and other
members of the international community to play a more central role in confronting
crises on the continent. Indeed, in recent years African armed forces have
increasingly served as the backbone supporting various peacekeeping operations
in the region. It is important to add that the international community has frequently
tried to facilitate the deployment of African armed forces with aid and training. From
this reality, the following study goes beyond the current literature by focusing on the
international factors behind African participation in United Nations (UN) peace-
keeping operations in Africa. In doing so, this research focuses on US military aid
and foreign troop training from 2002 to 2012, and its impact on African deployments
into UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. As can be expected, such third-party help
appears to be an important motivating factor encouraging African troop deployment
into crises on the continent.
Keywords Africa, peacekeeping, conflict management, military training, donor assistance, United States, United
Nations
Introduction
Africa is currently experiencing some of the world’s deadliest civil conflicts, testing the
international community’s ability to respond. Nine of the total 16 (56%) United Nations
(UN) peacekeeping operations underway are in Africa: Abyei, Central African Republic
(CAR), Cote d’Ivoire, Darfur, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Mali,
South Sudan and the Western Sahara. While different deployment configurations and mission
mandates have been used (including UN, regional and sub-regional peacekeeping, hybrid
missions between various levels, and missions led by major international powers), no simple
solution has been found. Yet it is apparent that ‘since the end of the Cold War, Sub-Saharan
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African states have dramatically increased their participation in international peacekeeping
operations in Africa’.1 This increased deployment of African peacekeepers to missions in
Africa merits further attention.
There are important drawbacks to relying on African peacekeeping forces. Centrally, most
African states require outside assistance to prepare and send their armed forces, as well as to
maintain them, in missions on the continent. This does not mean that African troops are
incapable of being the central actors in peacekeeping operations. Indeed, in recent years some
African states have regularly deployed their armed forces into African crises, and in relatively
large numbers. However, for the most part, they accomplish this with outside help and
incentives, primarily coming in the form of training and assistance. The international donor
community, especially the United States (US) – the key donor examined in this study2–
regularly train and assist African troops in an effort to build up individual state capacities and
encourage regional cooperation.3 Such training and aid can be critical to helping African states
commit their troops to peacekeeping on the continent. As Gompert clearly argues, ‘[w]ith
Western help, capable African combat troops … can be improved and melded into effective
multilateral intervention forces’.4
This research asks one critical question. In Africa, how has US military aid and training
influenced which countries provide peacekeepers and in what quantities? This study confronts
the recent literature on peacekeeping and questions its overemphasis on the domestic
characteristics of the troop-sending countries in addressing who commits peacekeepers. In
addition to national-level factors, it is important to bring in the role of outside third parties –
mainly those who supply military training and assistance. This research argues that such aid
and training not only prepares African armed forces for peacekeeping, but also acts as
enticements or incentives to encourage regional states to deploy peacekeepers into African
crises.
This study addresses the above-mentioned research question in three phases. First, it is
important to assess the various reasons that motivate African states to provide peacekeepers for
the various crises on the continent. This initial section outlines the various arguments behind
the desire to encourage African states to be at the forefront of peacekeeping on the continent.
Building on this, the second section traces the recent evolution of peacekeeping operations in
Africa, while examining the emergence of the key troop-contributing African states in recent
years. Finally, this study concludes with a statistical analysis used to capture generalisations
about the impact of US-provided aid and training, while controlling for a number of
domestic-level variables from the literature on African state actors in their decisions to send
troops into UN peacekeeping operations on the continent. The overall objective of this study
is to provide an empirical assessment of the impact of US military training and assistance on
the deployment of African peacekeepers into regional crises. This analysis points to the
conclusion that the US exerts an important influence on who participates in UN
peacekeeping missions in Africa and to what extent.
Deploying African troops in Africa
It is not new to argue that African states should be at the forefront of deploying their own
troops as peacekeepers in African crises.5 Three main reasons stand out supporting this
argument. To begin with, Africans are closest in proximity to the crises on the continent; and
2 African Security Review Institute for Security Studies
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Africans understand the impact of these conflicts better than any outside force because they
experience direct spillover from them. Furthermore, encouraging African deployments within
an international, regional or sub-regional multilateral framework builds collective security
arrangements, creating closer ties between African states, hopefully facilitating more peaceful
interactions. Finally, enabling African states to be more proficient peacekeepers will hopefully
enhance state capacities to deal with future crises more effectively.
African proximity to Africa
First and foremost, proximity stands out as a clear reason for donors such as the US to want to
encourage increased African involvement in peacekeeping on the continent. It can be argued
that local actors know their neighbours best, much better than any peacekeeping operation
comprised of distant outsiders. They have a crucial advantage in that they often have a direct
knowledge of the cultures that they are dealing with and the prevailing norms and languages,
as well as acceptable and unacceptable behaviours. This closeness ‘provides them with a better
understanding of a conflict’s dynamics, key players and context-specific management and
resolution options’.6 As a result, regional and sub-regional forces may be better received and
accepted by the local populations.
Proximity should also facilitate a much more rapid and less expensive response. Troops
from neighbouring countries, along with their equipment, do not need to be ferried across the
planet. This advantage should lower logistical and operational costs considerably. Further-
more, it makes sense that the leaders of states in the immediate vicinity of a civil conflict
would view ending violence and restoring a functioning state as part of their direct national
interest. Extra-regional actors are not as directly impacted by the externalities of such civil wars
that are outside of their own neighbourhood.
However, geographical and cultural proximities might not always contribute positively to
an intervention and legitimise an intervener’s behaviour. Just because you are in the
neighbourhood does not mean that you will help out in a benevolent manner. In fact, being
from the neighbourhood can be a significant drawback, as the initial problems may directly
involve the intervening neighbour. Sub-regional forces can at times make a bad situation
worse. There are several clear examples in recent history. Ethiopia’s unilateral military
incursion into Somalia, which began in 2006 to depose the Union of Islamic Courts,
demonstrates that even actors with relatively large armed forces and international (US)
support can get bogged down by legitimacy problems. Chad’s recent troubled intervention in
the CAR provides an additional illustration of how neighbours can exacerbate an already
dangerous situation and can be perceived as biased interlopers. A further example is Rwanda, a
very strong, emerging military actor on the continent. Over the past decade, Kigali has
regularly contributed large numbers of its armed forces as peacekeepers to multilateral
peacekeeping operations in Africa. Rwanda has been a critical linchpin in the current joint
operation between the African Union (AU) and the UN in Darfur. However, President Paul
Kagame’s armed forces have also served to undermine stability in central Africa by consistently
arming and intervening on behalf of various militia groups in the neighbouring DRC. As
Beswick points out, while Rwanda is contributing to ‘African solutions’ in Darfur, they are
also significantly adding to ‘African problems’ in the DRC.7 This only underlines the
problems of legitimacy and impartiality that neighbouring states can run into when
intervening militarily in their own sub-region.
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Increased role of African states in the international system
Additionally, participation in conflict management efforts on the continent can improve
diplomatic relations between countries and with the international community as a whole.
Fundamentally, peacekeeping may augment national prestige on the world stage and increase
the participating state’s leverage with regard to donors. Shimizu and Sandler suggest that states
may benefit from prestige and the enhancement of their overall status when assisting stability
efforts in neighbouring countries in crisis.8 Participation in south and central Somalia gives
the intervening states such as Uganda and Kenya leverage and makes them pivotal players in
constructing sub-regional and regional collective security arrangements. Furthermore, these
troop-contributing states appear to be upright international citizens, providing a critical public
good: peace. Peacekeeping also gives the contributing countries a greater voice than they
would otherwise have. It increases their clout in decision-making structures in international
bodies such as the UN, the AU and the various sub-regional organisations on the continent.
Strengthening African states
Donor assistance and training helps strengthen state responses to various crises. This makes it
clear why donors and recipients alike desire to enhance African capacities. However, by far the
most obvious drawback surrounding the use of African troops in peacekeeping on the
continent or anywhere else is that African states lack resources. Most states in the region
(besides a very small number) simply cannot fund and undertake their own military
interventions without some sort of outside help. Because of various financial, logistical and
operational constraints, militaries in the region lack the capacity and the resources to commit
meaningfully to conflict prevention and resolution through military means without significant
assistance.9 This reality is problematic. Unfortunately, ‘[w]e have ended up with a system
where the weakest groups go to the hardest places’.10 This significantly undermines the
autonomy of African states when it comes to mounting peacekeeping operations.
To build capacities, donors have increased their provision of military assistance and troop
training to Africa in recent years. Figure 1, containing data on US foreign military training
levels, provides evidence of this trend.
Interestingly, US military training of African soldiers has seen a marked increase since
2007. With this, the US is trying to encourage and support African deployment of
peacekeepers into peacekeeping operations in the region. The Bureau of African Affairs
Figure 1 Total annual number of African troops trained by the US
0
10 000
20 000
30 000
40 000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source US Department of State, Foreign military training and Department of Defense (DoD)
engagement activities of interest, www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/
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within the US Department of State funds and manages Africa Contingency Operations
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) as part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).
The US Department of Defense (DoD) and private contractors support this programme,
designed to prepare African armed forces for peacekeeping. Between 1997 and 2012, ACOTA
(and its predecessor the African Crisis Response Initiative, ACRI) trained 215 000 soldiers,
while facilitating the deployment of approximately 20 African battalions annually.11 These
types of training programmes aim to build the capacities of the armed forces of African states
while encouraging their participation in peacekeeping operations on the continent.
Encouraging African peacekeeping in Africa
Turning to Africans to deal with crises and civil conflicts in the region is nothing new. Just as
the Berlin Wall fell, one began to see the emergence of an embryonic sub-regional security
complex in West Africa. The Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervention into the Liberian civil war in August 1990
characterises these developments. Such a move represented an important turning point in the
construction of an African crisis response infrastructure on the continent. Since then, African
participation in most multilateral military interventions in Africa has been high. These actions
have frequently been under African command and within the framework of (or in cooperation
with) an African regional or sub-regional organisation.
At the time of the Liberian intervention, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali in An Agenda for Peace argued that regional security arrangements are an important part of
peacekeeping in order to help relieve the UN’s increasingly heavy peacekeeping burden in the
wake of the end of the Cold War.12 Three years later, after the botched Somalia intervention
and the lack of action during the Rwandan genocide, Boutros-Ghali also wrote in a report
entitled Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peace-keeping in Africa that there was an
important role for regional organisations in the activities of the UN on the continent:
It is increasingly apparent that the United Nations cannot address every potential and
actual conflict troubling the world. Regional or sub-regional organizations sometimes have
a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts
and to assist the United Nations in containing them.13
Today, a number of African states actively participate in peacekeeping operations in the region.
As discussed earlier, African governments are acutely aware of the desire for them to send
troops to help in peacekeeping operations in Africa. This may be because, as Donald Rothchild
has indicated, African states are ‘increasingly viewing some type of self-help as essential to
reduce threats from violence’ and the spillover of externalities from neighbouring conflicts.14
This self-help or ‘neighbourhood watch’ conflict management method has become critical in
confronting state crises across Africa. Furthermore, Adebajo adds that, ‘like a sheriff, [African
states] must demonstrate capacity and political will to gather a posse in defence of mutual
regional security interests’.15 For these reasons, among others, states in the region are willing
to contribute troops and to help manage conflict in their backyard. Yet, which African states
have been deploying their troops in crises on the continent? Table 1 gives the annual average
for the peacekeeping troops deployed by African states in multilateral UN operations between
2002 and 2012.
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These states are frequently the most willing to commit troops to conflict management
efforts on the continent. As Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams note, they make up the small core
of African states that do most of the African peacekeeping.17 These critical actors are central in
the development of regional security complexes capable of tackling state crises on the
continent.18 As Deng et al. point out, ‘[r]egions generally are organized around certain states
that have the power and position potentially to play the role of hegemon or act as a pole
around which the security or insecurity of other states revolves’.19 The 10 states in Table 1 are
such hegemonic states.
Empirical analysis
While much of the research on who contributes peacekeepers focuses on the domestic factors
of the sending state, the research presented here brings in two international factors: the role of
external third-party military aid and foreign troop training. Given the capacity gap of a number
of African states, international donors can play a critical role in enabling African troops to
participate in peacekeeping operations. This study examines 54 states in Africa during the
period from 2002 to 2012, the unit of analysis being the country-year. This should provide 594
country-year observations. However, due to missing data, the overall number of country-years
available for analysis is somewhat less (see Table 3). This problem is due to the fact that in
some cases such as Somalia and the DRC, data simply does not exist in any accurate form on a
number of variables during some years for the period in question. Such longitudinal data (in
cross-sectional and time-series form) requires the use of particular statistical techniques that
can take into consideration relationships measured across time and space. Before moving on to
the statistical analysis, however, it is pertinent to discuss the key variables operationalised in
this study.
The dependent variable used here provides a count of the total annual amount of a given
country’s troops that are sent to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.20 Put
differently, each country-year observation on the dependent variable consists of the total
Table 1 Top 10: annual average number of African troops deployed in UN
peacekeeping operations in Africa (2002–2012)16
Country Annual average number of troops deployed in Africa (2002–2012)
Nigeria 3 591
Ethiopia 2 996
Ghana 1 869
Egypt 1 813
Rwanda 1 691
South Africa 1 627
Morocco 1 418
Senegal 1 196
Kenya 1 182
Benin 747
Source UN, Troop and police contributors archive (1990–2013),
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml
6 African Security Review Institute for Security Studies
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number of peacekeepers that the particular country sends into UN peacekeeping operations in
Africa for each particular year. For example, Zambia provided 352 troops for UN
peacekeeping in African in 2012 and Nigeria sent 3 159 troops in 2002, while Ethiopia
deployed 6 116 peacekeepers to UN peacekeeping operations in 2011. The average annual
deployment of African troops in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa between 2002 and
2012 consisted of approximately 362 troops per country, per year. The information for the
dependent variable is derived from online documents maintained by the UN’s Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). For consistency, year-end, December data has been
used to construct the dependent variable, providing a cross-sectional time-series in which a
generalised least square (GLS) method is used to compensate for temporal and spatial
dependence between groups of observations in the dataset. The statistical package STATA has
been used for undertaking the quantitative analyses.
The literature concerning peacekeeping deployments focuses primarily on the domestic
characteristics of the sender nation. To measure these national-level factors, three explanatory
variables are operationalised, measured with readily available annual data: gross national
income (GNI) per capita; Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores; and the
total number of military personnel in a given country. However, the research presented here
brings in two international factors: US military aid and US troop training. These influences
should have a positive impact and encourage the deployment of peacekeepers.
Independent variables based on domestic factors
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)
An important argument in the literature points out that relatively poorer countries in Africa
should deploy their troops more readily into regional and sub-regional peacekeeping
operations on the continent, as opposed to richer ones.21 Victor along with Bove and Elia
find that a country’s troop contributions to peacekeeping operations are best explained by its
relative wealth or, more specifically, the lack of relative wealth.22 That is to say, the poorer a
country is, the more likely it is to participate in peacekeeping because poorer countries would
benefit most from foreign donations of soldier stipends, training and military equipment.
A big motivating factor is that supplemental pay for troops participating in UN operations
stands at around US$1 000 per month.23 This is a windfall for many soldiers from African
countries. Furthermore, the troop-contributing states can take their own cut of this dividend
in the form of taxes. As a baseline control variable, the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI) annual data for per capita income are used.24 From this, it seems easy to
advance the hypothesis that there should be a negative correlation between higher than average
GNI per capita and the deployment of peacekeepers. That is to say, the richer a country is, the
less likely it would be to committing its troops to peacekeeping operations.
Freedom House democracy scores
The peacekeeping literature also frequently uses the troop contributor’s level of democracy as
an indicator to determine which states will participate in peacekeeping operations. Anderson
argues that democratic states commonly step forward to defend international stability and
assist populations in dire need.25 Lebovic along with Daniel and Caraher conclude that
democracies are much more likely to deploy their armed forces in peace operations.26 To
capture this purported relationship, Freedom House scores are used in this study.27 The
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measurement for Political Rights to the Civil Liberties score is added, and the result divided by
two, providing a one- to seven-point scale. In this aggregate of the two Freedom House
democracy scores, a seven indicates a highly authoritarian country. A score of one denotes a
highly democratic state. Based on the literature, one should expect that democratic governance
should be present in the most consistent peacekeeping states. That is to say, there should be a
negative relationship between the Freedom House scores and the number of troops deployed
(i.e., peacekeeping operation participants should have a lower number on these democracy
scores, thus indicating that they are relatively more democratic).
Total armed forces personnel
There is not an equal distribution of military power among the nations of Africa.28 From this,
it seems obvious to argue that countries with large armed forces should be able to send more
of their troops to peacekeeping operations. According to Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu, and
Shimizu and Sandler, relatively stronger states, with larger than average militaries, can and
should contribute disproportionately to peacekeeping.29 Victor also finds that the size of a
state’s military successfully predicts their contribution to UN peacekeeping.30 The size of a
given African state’s military should have a positive impact on their willingness to send troops
into multilateral peacekeeping operations on the continent. This explanatory variable is
derived from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators for this study.31
Independent variables based on external factors (assistance
and training)
Beyond the domestic factors frequently brought up in the peacekeeping contributions
literature, it is argued that states can be encouraged to send their troops on peacekeeping
operations through the provision of aid and training from the international community. This
research examines data from the principle donor of military aid and training to African states –
the US. This particular donor is used because of the availability of data on its activities. The
variables for US military assistance and US military training are lagged by one year on the data
from the dependent variable, meaning that, for example, the choice to deploy peacekeepers in
a given year is influenced by the aid and training from the previous year. Therefore, aid and
training impacts future troop contributions.
US military assistance
Pushing the peacekeeping responsibilities onto African states means that there must be an
increased emphasis on building up their military capacities.32 Helping along these lines is also
important for encouraging participation in peacekeeping operations. Since most African states
require some assistance in sending their armed forces abroad and maintaining them in the
theatre, it is critical to examine how African governments react to the provision of donor
military aid. It makes sense to argue that troop-contributing countries in Africa would decide
to deploy peacekeepers in the region in exchange for foreign military aid. This training and
equipment should strengthen and modernise their security forces. This study advances the
hypothesis that military aid should correlate positively with African peacekeeping troop
deployments. That is to say, larger than average amounts of military assistance should incite
African state recipients to send more troops into hot spots on the continent as peacekeepers. In
order to measure this, US military assistance as a proxy is used, since this funding information
8 African Security Review Institute for Security Studies
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is readily available from the US Agency for International Development (USAID).33 The US
military aid data is lagged by one year behind the dependent variable.
US military training
As discussed throughout this study, the international community has increasingly tried to
bolster the response capacity of African militaries and encourage their deployment as
peacekeepers on the continent. To encourage deployment, the US provides foreign assistance
along with troop training for their armed forces. Washington’s ACOTA and GPOI
programmes train African armed forces with the direct objective of encouraging and
facilitating their deployment into peacekeeping operations on the continent. However, do
African states respond to military training by sending their armed forces to participate in
peacekeeping? Again, because of the availability of data, only troop training provided by the
US is used.34 The US is the principle trainer of African armed forces, preparing them for
deployment in peacekeeping operations on the continent and elsewhere. It is argued that
military education programmes from the US should be excellent predictors of future
deployments. The ability to participate in such military training programmes represents an
important incentive and potential to build capacity, undertaken in exchange for African states
sending their troops into multilateral peace operations on the continent. This explanatory
factor is lagged by one year on the dependent variable, as training from the previous year
should have a positive impact and encourage peacekeeping troop deployments in the given
observed year on the outcome variable.
Discussion of statistical results
This study examines several factors that influence the deployment of peacekeeping forces sent
by African states into peacekeeping operations on the continent. Table 2 on next page top
provides a starting point with some interesting descriptive statistics on the profiles of the top
10 African contributors to UN peacekeeping operations.
Out of the 10 states listed in the table above, one state in particular stands out – so much so
that it should have an impact on any statistical analysis. Egypt clearly is something of an outlier
in terms of the US military aid it receives and the overall size of its armed forces. Cairo’s army
is a leviathan with 835 500 active armed forces personnel (in 2012), by far the largest military
force in Africa.35 Furthermore, Washington sends a colossal amount of foreign military
assistance to Egypt, with just over US$1,3 billion in 2012 (averaging around US$1,5 billion
annually between 2002 and 2012). This is considerably more than the entire annual bilateral
US military aid budget for the rest of Africa, which totalled only US$293 million in 2012.
Since Egypt is such a significant outlier, it skews the results of any quantitative analysis. To
remedy this problem, it is necessary to run separate statistical models, both with and without
the case of Egypt in the dataset.
Beyond Egypt as an outlier, there is an additional significant problem. It appears that high
levels of intercorrelation exist between several of the independent variables. This alters the
statistical results in rather important ways. Primarily, two of the explanatory variables correlate
at relatively high levels with the factor controlling for overall military size. The largest
correlation is between military size and US military assistance at the level of 0,843. In addition,
military size and Freedom House scores also intercorrelate at a relatively high level of 0,299.
The relationships between these independent variables make it necessary to run statistical
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models with and without the annual military size variable in the analysis. This should allow
for more accurate statistical results, and a better understanding of the relationship between the
explanatory variables and the deployment of UN peacekeepers in Africa. Overall, in order to
deal with the outlier and intercorrelation problems, it is necessary to run four separate models
in the statistical analysis.
Because the dataset is longitudinal, a GLS regression is used to analyse the data in this
study.37 This technique can take cross-sectional data and time into consideration. A
straightforward ordinary least squares (OLS) regression or even a logistical regression would
not be able to take data grouped by time and space into consideration. It is a key assumption of
OLS or logistic regressions techniques that observations cannot relate with other observations.
However, the data groups on country and time, violating this assumption – thus, use of a GLS
analysis is necessary. Table 3 presents the results for the four regression analyses.
In the results from the statistical analysis, presented in Table 3 on next page, several
interesting findings stand out and require further discussion. To begin with, the direction of
the coefficient concerning the variable for per capita income (GNI per capita) is negative
across all four models. This is consistent with the hypotheses put forward in this study and
with the arguments most frequently found in the relevant literature on peacekeeping troop
contributions. That is to say, although this independent variable is not statistically significant,
one should expect that during the period in question, poorer (lower GNI per capita) African
states should more readily participate in peacekeeping operations on the African continent. At
least three explanations are clear: the pull factor of wages received by troops deployed in
peacekeeping operations; the desire of poorer states to build the capacities of their armed
forces; and the need to strengthen sub-regional security structures and combat the spillover
effects of conflicts in neighbouring states. However, it is important to point out that these
results are not statistically significant.
Table 2 Top 10: profiles of key African peacekeepers36
Country
Average annual
UN
peacekeepers
deployed in
Africa
Average
annual
troops
trained
by US
Average annual
US military aid
(US$)
Overall
size of
armed
forces
(2012)
Freedom
House
scores
(2012)
Nigeria 3 591 2 021 4 979 720 162 000 4
Ethiopia 2 996 313 2 867 545 138 000 6
Ghana 1 869 1 442 2 168 040 15 500 1,5
Egypt 1 813 1 086 1 477 582 741 835 500 5,5
Rwanda 1 691 980 1 164 388 35 000 5,5
South Africa 1 627 392 2 691 726 77 153 2
Morocco 1 418 245 19 595 331 245 800 4,5
Senegal 1 196 1 087 3 097 389 18 620 3
Kenya 1 182 357 5 362 199 29 120 3,5
Benin 747 847 358 981 9 450 2
African
average
389 301 32 303 851 63 628 4,4
10 African Security Review Institute for Security Studies
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Table 3 GLS regression analyses38
MODEL 1 with Egypt MODEL 2 w/o Egypt MODEL 3 with Egypt MODEL 4 w/o Egypt
coef. sig. coef. sig. coef. sig. coef. sig.
GNI per capita −0,016 −0,018 −0,013 −0,016
Freedom House scores −11,879 *** −11,091 *** −4,123 −4,165
Total armed forces personnel 0,006 *** 0,004 ***
US military assistance −1,61E−06 *** −5,84E−07 6,76E−07 *** 7,04E−07
US military training 0,431 *** 0,441 *** 0,473 *** 0,479 ***
Constant 594,824 *** 581,427 *** 438,806 *** 437,531 ***
N 528 517 564 553
Notes *** = highly statistically significant at < 0.001
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Perhaps more interesting, in Model 1, four out of the five independent variables
operationalised in this study (Freedom House scores, armed forces size, US military training
and US military assistance) are highly statistically significant, with two having a positive
impact on the dependent variable while the other two relationships in the data are negative.
Different configurations of the cases (including the outlier Egypt or not) and of the
operationalised explanatory factors (including or excluding the variable for overall military
size) lead to somewhat different results. However, the exception is the variable for US troop
training that remains positive and highly statistically significant across all of the models. These
results deserve further elaboration.
First, from the statistical results in this study, countries with high Freedom House scores
(consisting of the average of the given country’s annual political rights and civil liberties
scores) are less likely to send members of their armed forces as peacekeepers in UN operations
across Africa. Since higher scores on these Freedom House indicators point to more
authoritarian forms of governance, the negative result produced here leads to the belief that
democracies more readily deployed peacekeepers in these African cases during the period in
question. The literature also frequently evokes this relationship. Simply put, the more
democratic states in Africa appear to send a larger number of troops to join UN peacekeeping
operations in Africa than the authoritarian states on the continent. From the descriptive
statistics in Table 2, six of the top 10 troop-contributing states (Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria,
Senegal and South Africa) all have Freedom House scores (2012) below the overall African
average of 4,4. Yet, this does not stop relatively authoritarian states such as Ethiopia, Rwanda
or Egypt from sending a significant number of troops into peacekeeping operations on the
continent. Problematically, it is important to note that this variable correlates highly with
the total number of armed forces from a given country. When excluding military size from
the regression analysis, Freedom House scores are no longer significant, although the
relationship remains negative.
Furthermore, the independent variable for the overall annual size of a given country’s
armed forces appears to be highly significant and have a positive relationship with the number
of peacekeeping troops deployed, when controlling for other factors. This positive relationship
echoes throughout the recent literature, as discussed in a previous section. While the inclusion
of this factor was limited to only two of the four models in the regression analysis due to
intercorrelation with two other important explanatory variables, the results do suggest that
African countries with large armed forces are more likely to deploy their troops as UN
peacekeepers on the continent. Five out of the top 10 UN peacekeeping troop contributors
(Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa) are all above the African average in their
total armed forces personnel, which is 63 628 for the entire continent.39 However, it is
important to add that Egypt is a clear outlier, with 835 500 troops (in 2012), far larger than any
other military in Africa. Regardless, this does not stop countries with relatively small armed
forces, such as Benin or Ghana, from regularly sending their troops to support UN missions.
More importantly for this research, the two variables that examine the impact of external
actors in the deployment of African troops into UN peacekeeping operations in the region
appear to provide some interesting results that clearly require future attention. The two issues
of intercorrelation, and the outlier of Egypt, provide problems for understanding the influence
of US military assistance on African peacekeeping. Due to the very high levels of correlation
between armed forces size and the explanatory variable for US military assistance, when used
together in any regression analysis these two factors influence and skew each other’s results.
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Therefore, out of the four GLS regression models proposed in Table 3, Model 4 seems to
capture the impact of US military assistance the best. Without Egypt or the military size
variable altering the statistical results, it appears that US military assistance has a positive
relationship with African peacekeeping troop deployment in Africa. However, this statistical
correlation is not significant in Model 4. Although this empirical relationship is weak, it does
point in the direction that military aid from Washington may be encouraging African states to
deploy members of their armed forces peacekeepers. However, when examining the empirical
data further, in a more descriptive manner, as in Table 4 below, some interesting trends
stand out.
Again, it is critical to note the presence of a huge outlier, Egypt. Cairo received an average
of close to US$1,5 billion in military assistance annually from the US between 2002 and 2012.
This dwarfs the other top 10 US military aid recipients. In addition, four of the 10 countries in
Table 4 (DRC, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan/South Sudan) are either emerging from civil wars,
or are still engaged in them. Donors like the US send military assistance to these states not
necessarily to encourage them to send their troops abroad as peacekeepers, but to help them
fight insurgents at home. In addition, it is worth pointing out that eight out of the 10
(Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan/South Sudan and Tunisia) are
involved, in one way or another, in the US global war on terrorism. This military aid is
perhaps not to facilitate or pay for peacekeeping but used instead to help the US pursue its
fight against terrorism. These explanations help us to understand why US military aid does
not correlate with levels of African peacekeeping in any statistically significant manner.
However, the most important finding in this research is that US foreign military training
correlates with the amount of African troops deployed into UN peacekeeping operations in
Africa. This correlation is positive and highly statistically significant. Unlike the other
indicators, Egypt is not an outlier in US troop training. In addition, the other explanatory
variables do not have high levels of intercorrelation with military training. This explains why
the direction of the relationship between troop training and the dependent variable remains
positive and statistically significant across the four models, as seen in Table 3. These empirical
results indicate that the US military training of African troops at year t − 1 as part of
programmes such as ACOTA strongly correlate with the deployment of that same country’s
Table 4 Average annual US military assistance (2002–2012)
Average annual US military assistance (US$)
Egypt 1 477 582 740
Sudan 98 730 133
Somalia 47 655 450
Liberia 27 415 875
Morocco 19 595 331
Tunisia 13 666 432
DRC 8 537 892
Kenya 5 362 198
Djibouti 5 080 396
Nigeria 4 979 719
Source USAID, U.S. overseas loans and grants, obligations and loan authorizations,
https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/data/greenbook.cfm
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troops as part of a UN peacekeeping operation on the continent at time t. That is to say, the
previous year’s US training has an extremely strong, positive influence on the next year’s
decision to send troops to support a UN peacekeeping operation on the continent. Troop
training appears to not only be crucial in developing the capacity of various armed forces in
Africa, but US military training programmes such as ACOTA and GPOI are actually
providing important incentives that facilitate and encourage the deployment of African armed
forces on the continent as peacekeepers. Encouraging African peacekeeping in Africa is one of
the stated goals of ACOTA, and it appears to be working.
Conclusion
As Paul Williams indicates, ‘African governments bear the primary responsibility’ for dealing
with and responding to the various conflicts on the continent today.40 It makes sense to
increase African participation in activities such as peacekeeping on the continent. This builds a
sense of ownership and responsibility, while encouraging African states to cooperate in
building regional and sub-regional conflict management structures. That said, it is important
to understand what motivates critical actors in Africa to participate in the construction of
various security infrastructures on the continent, beyond simple ad hoc responses to given
conflicts. If the US or other actors in the international community want to get help from
Africa to deal with problems in the region, they should clearly be building state capacities and
encouraging states in the region to cooperate so that they can play a larger role together. As this
study argues, US training programmes appear to play an important role in this process. The
relationship between the incentives provided by the key actors in international community and
the willingness of African states to deploy their own peacekeepers into costly and dangerous
situations must be examined further by both expanding the number of donors and recipients,
as well as the types of incentives. This is important since, as demonstrated here, aid and
training can be highly motivating forces.
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